


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THE
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OF
FRANCE
EXPLAIN'D.

*Cur igitur Pacem nolo? Quia turpis est, quia
Periculosa, quia esse non potest, Decepti, decepti,
inquam, sumus, Patres Conscripti: ANTONII
est acta causa ab Amicis ejus, non Publica,*
Cicero,



L O N D O N;

Printed for A. BALDWIN near the Oxford-Arms
in Warwick-Lane. 1712. Price 3d.

Where may be had, The Allies and the late Ministry
defended.

THE
OFFERS
OF
FRANCE
SECOND

The first issue of the
Paris Convention, 1795,
was a small tract, and
the second, 1796, was
a larger one, and the third,
1797, was still larger.




LONDON

Printed for J. B. B. in the Office of
the National Assembly, 1797.
Where may be had, the
National Assembly, 1797.



The OFFERS of FRANCE Explain'd.



IF I may judge by my self, 'tis impossible to express the Surprize, Indignation, and Concern, which the Offers of *France* for a General Peace must have rais'd in the Breast of every true *Englishman*. Is this the good Peace we have been made to expect? Are these the Fruits of a Successful War? Is this the Provision made for the *Safety* of our Allies? this the *Satisfaction* to the Emperor for his Pretensions to the *Spanish* Monarchy? this the *Barrier* for which the *Dutch* have spent so many Millions? this the *Security* for *Great Britain*? Is this *reducing the EXORBITANT POWER* of *France*, and *preserving the LIBERTY OF EUROPE*? Is this the Result of the private Conferences, that have been carry'd on for six months together with the Ministers of *France*? When Monsieur *Menager's* seven Preliminary Articles first appear'd, they were in every body's opinion so insufficient to be the Foundation of a good Peace, that all People were asham'd of them. The Enemies of the present M——y readily concluded from them that we had made a separate Peace for our selves, and their Friends a great while disown'd them. Many well-meaning People really thought them feign'd, and I have seen a Vindication of the present M——y, that

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endeavours to prove them so, by Reasons very plausible, and by such Explications as shew them to be very inconsistent with the Interest of us and our Allies; and from thence infers 'tis impossible they can be genuine. And even after we were assur'd by all our foreign News, that the same Preliminaries had been communicated to our several Allies, many among us could not be persuaded they were the same; and for this Opinion they pretended great Authorities. But when the Secret could no longer be kept, the Mystery ended in a *French* Distinction, That these seven Propositions were not *Preliminaries*, but *Proposals* only: tho they have constantly been call'd so, both by *France* and our Allies, and by all among our selves, except the Authors of this useful Distinction; by help of which the Cheat pass upon us, and we were made still to hope for a good Peace, such a one as would fully answer the Ends of the Grand Alliance, and fall little short of the late Preliminaries, except in what related to *Spain* and the *Indies*: and for the Restitution even of them, according to the Sense of all former Parl——ts, and the late Vote of the House of Lords, we were promis'd from the Throne, that all endeavours should be us'd. And to make us the more easy under the Apprehensions these seven Articles had rais'd, we have been told from time to time, that the *French* had agreed to new *Preliminaries* in favour of the Allies, and particularly that they had desisted from their Pretence to an Equivalent for *Dunkirk*; that *Strasburg* should be restor'd to the Empire; and that a considerable part of *Spain* should be given to the Emperor. But what are these Cheats and Amusements like to end in? The Allies, upon the Assurances given them that these Articles should not be insisted on as the Foundation of the Peace, consent to a Congress, Conferences are open'd, and after a few previous Meetings the *French* explain themselves, and offer such a *Plan* for a General Peace, as is below the worst
Terms

Terms the most fearful could expect: and no body who has offer'd to explain Monsieur *Menager's* Preliminaries, has equal'd the scandalous Explication, which the *French* have themselves given of them. According to which all the Ends of the War are intirely defeated, our Allies are on all sides expos'd as much or more to the Invasion of the Enemy, than they were before the War began, and the Exorbitant Power of *France* prodigiously increas'd. All our Conquests in *Flanders* since the *Ramellies-Campaign* are scandalously to be given up; and our Allies, after so many Successes, are to be content with much the same poor Barrier, which the Fate of the most unsuccessful Wars had forc'd them to submit to; all *Europe* is to be left in the most precarious Condition, and consequently our selves, whose Interest her Majesty has declar'd *to be inseparable from that of her Allies.*

What can the meaning of all this be? What is it has encourag'd the *French*, after so many Disgraces and Defeats, to offer such a dishonourable ignominious Peace? I know we shall be bid to take heart; and to delude us still, shall be told, that these are *Offers* only, and that the Allies are not oblig'd to accept them, but in their turns may make their Demands; and that we must not be surpriz'd, if the *French* don't offer the most they will give at first.

But have we not been amus'd with this Cant long enough? Have we not been told, the *French* were very sincere, and would give *just Satisfaction* to all our Allies? Has it not long since been confidently reported from the mouth of the greatest Man, that we should have such a Peace *as has not been made these two hundred Years?* And so indeed we shall in one sense, if these Terms or any thing like them be accepted. But if the *French* are sincere, why don't they pull off the Mask, and to make short work, speak plain at first? If they intend to consent to a reasonable Peace, why do they offer Terms so wide-

ly different from what the Allies can with Safety or Honour accept? Small Differences may be compromised; and by receding a little on both sides, matters may be adjusted, when the Parties are agreed in the main Articles. But what appearance is there of that here? Who can expect the *French*, after such Terms, will make the Concessions that our common Safety makes necessary? Or how can the Allies, without submitting themselves to the Mercy of *France*, accept any thing like the Terms offer'd them? If *France* has the modesty to offer these Terms to the Allies after the many Successes of so long a War in favour of them, I would be glad to know what Terms we might have expected from the Grand Monarch, if he had given the Allies the Defeats he has receiv'd from them? If the Conferences for a Peace had been open'd at the first Motion of the *French* for it, such Offers after such a War would hardly then have been tolerable: but how these sincere People can presume to make such scandalous Offers now, is perfectly unaccountable.

For what is it we can suppose has been these six or seven months past in agitation? What can have been the business of so many private and such long Conferences? To what purpose was it, that so many Voyages have been made backwards and forwards to *Versailles*? To what end have the Agents of *France*, Monsieur *Menager* and others, been shut up with our Ministers at Monsieur *Matthew's* whole days together? Can any body imagine all this Expence of Money and Time was for Grimace only, or purely for Chat and a little trifling *French* Conversation, or to do Business? But that Business was either our own Business, or what concern'd our Allies. 'Tis true indeed, the Allies were not acquainted with these secret Conferences, nor consulted in what concerns their several Interests, as they ought to have been by the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance: but no body can suppose that the
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settling our own Affairs and the Articles relating to our selves, could be a Work of six Months; much less are we at liberty to entertain such a Suspicion, after we have been told from the greatest Authority, That *the least Colour has not been given for thinking a separate Peace had been treated.*

We must therefore conclude, that the Security, and Interest, and Satisfaction of our Allies, were in great measure the Subject of these Conferences. But what sign is there of this in these Offers? What appearance that the least Care has been taken of them? One would naturally have expected, that the Offers of the *French* would have been such, as should have made some shew of Sincerity on their part, and carry'd in them some specious Marks at least of the Regard we have to our Allies. But as if there were no need of Management, nothing can be more impudent or barefac'd. There is no appearance of any Concern for our Allies, no sign of so many Conferences having been held, no fruits of so much Intimacy between us and the *French*. So that if we were to judg by these Offers, we must conclude, nothing at all was agitated in these Conferences, or at least nothing that relates to our Allies, or (which is most unreasonable to believe, because most unjust and absurd to do) that the Interests of our Allies have in these Conferences been sacrific'd to some separate Views for our selves. This is the plain Sense of these Offers, this is the Language of *the Conduct of the Allies*; but God forbid it should be the Design of our M—rs: God forbid the Nation should be deluded into such pernicious Measures, which in a few Years must be fatal to us as well as our Allies.

That these Apprehensions may not be thought to be hasty and ill-grounded, the Effect of Spleen or Ill-will, but just and reasonable, and what ought to be the Sense of every true *Englishman*; I will make a few short Remarks upon these Offers of the *French*,
with

with that Plainness, as will let the most ordinary Reader see, they tend to nothing but a ruinous and ignominious Peace.

The Copy I follow is that publish'd in the *Daily Courant* of the 13th instant, as being most exact; the Articles as there set down, tho' not number'd, are eighteen. The six first of which particularly relate to *England*; and considering how loving and dear the *French* and we are become of late to one another, to the Exclusion of all our old Friends, one would have expected to find his most *Christian Majesty* in these Articles very gracious, and that in what relates to *England* he had exceeded, or at least come up to the old Preliminaries. But for what Reasons I know not, perhaps only to disguise better their Intrigues, they are in appearance not a little short of them.

In the first Article the King promises to acknowledge the *Queen and the Succession at the signing of the Peace*; but in the former Negotiations, the acknowledging her is made a Preliminary: and tho' the acknowledging the Succession in the manner her Majesty shall think fit, may be thought a civil Complement, *France* had rather make that Complement, than engage to own the *Protestant Succession* by name, and according to our *Acts of Parliament*, which are the words of the Preliminaries; and the leaving them out now gives ground for various Speculations that I need not mention. Then for sending away the *Pretender*, that there is not the least mention of; to oblige perhaps a Party, who would not be so fond of this Peace, if it were not in hopes of seeing him soon, and of an easy Correspondence in the mean time.

The second Article regards the demolishing of *Dunkirk*, but with two *Limitations*: First, 'Tis to be after the Peace: And, Secondly, upon an *Equivalent to the King's Satisfaction*; exactly in the Language of Monsieur *Menager's* Articles. But by the old

old Preliminaries, since which we have made three very glorious Campaigns, 'tis agreed *Dunkirk* shall be demolish'd, and the Harbour ruin'd, while the General Peace is a treating, and unconditionally, without pretending to any Equivalent whatever. And to make this Article most scandalously unjust, we see by the ninth Article, that *Lille* and *Tournay* are to be this Equivalent; the two most important Conquests the Allies have made this War, the two best Securities of a lasting Peace by a good Barrier, and the two most sensible Losses *France* can have on that side, with respect both to their Trade and Strength: *Tournay* being the best Fortification in *Europe*; and *Lille*, besides its Strength, being the greatest Mart for Trade next *Lyons* in all the *French* Dominions. And as to the first of these Places, 'tis not only the best part of a good Barrier, 'tis absolutely necessary for the preservation of all the rest; for if it be suffer'd to be in *French* Hands, it makes them Masters of the *Schelde* to that degree, that whenever they think fit to attack either *Brabant* or *Flanders*, 'twill be impossible for the Troops in one Province to succour the other, any way but by making a great *Tour* round by *Ghent*, or *Audenarde*. And considering the Weakness of both those Places, and the Faction they have in those Provinces, 'twill be easy for the *French* to surprise or reduce either of them, or at least to block them up so between the *Lys* and the *Schelde*, that nothing can pass between those two Rivers. This is the *Equivalent* they demand for *Dunkirk*; and when they have this Equivalent, if we may judge by what has happen'd in all former Treaties, we may be very sure what is promis'd will never be perform'd, and that *Dunkirk* will be for the future the same Thorn to us it has been in former Wars.

By the third Article, *Sr. Christophers*, and *Hudson's Bay* and *Strait* are to be given up to us; and in this Article these new Offers will be said to exceed the

the old *Preliminaries*. But, First, What is given us by yielding *St. Christophers* intire to us, is a very poor Business; the whole is a very small Island, and the greatest part of it is ours already: nor is it of any present Advantage, tho it might be capable of producing Sugar, and that only; but it is now quite unplanted, and in a manner deserted. As to *Hudson's Bay*, in the *Preliminaries* indeed no particular mention is made of it, but the Rights of us and the *French* to the several Parts of it, were left to be discuss'd in the General Treaty. But the Benefit of this would also be very small at this time, since the Beaver Trade, which is now quite gone and neglected, was the chief thing that made this Bay of Concern and Importance to the Nation. But if this Article be in favour of us, Amends is made for it in the two next; for by the fourth, *Acadia* and *Port Royal*, which we have taken from the *French*, are to be restor'd to them. Indeed *Abel's* Articles, and from him I suppose the *Postman* tells us just the contrary. But if they had attended either to the Stile or to the Sense, they could not have been so mistaken, as to take *sa Majesté* for the Queen. They would either not name her, or give the Title of *Britannick* Majesty, as in the 9th Article relating to the *Spanish* Trade; besides, that *restoring* must be to those 'tis taken from, which is the *French*: So that one of the great Advantages *England* has by these Offers, is knock'd off by nothing else but a bare Translation of the Article as it ought to be. This Mistake can't be suppos'd to come from other hands, who would either impose on us, or could be so grossly impos'd on themselves, as not to distinguish what is to be given to the *French* King, and what to the *Queen*. What Mistakes we find therefore of that kind, I hope are to be imputed only to the little Scribblers employ'd under them.

The fifth Article gives us *Newfoundland* in the first part of it, and in the next takes it away again. We are to have the *Island*, but the *French* are to have the *Key* of it, *Placentia*, and the *Right of catching and drying Fish as before the War*, which is indeed the great use of it; and I believe our Merchants would like it as well if this Article were inverted, and we were to have that Right and that Town for our share, and the *French* the rest. The old Preliminaries took another sort of care of this important Article, and did expressly stipulate, that *France* should quit that great Island intirely to *England*.

The sixth Article differs nothing from the 19th Preliminary, except in the manner of Expression, that 'tis left to *England* to make a Treaty of Commerce either before or after the Peace: Whereas in the Preliminaries 'tis said, *It shall be treated in the Principal Negotiation for a General Peace*; which is the same thing. But possibly for more Reasons than one this Treaty may be made before a Peace; and tho such a Treaty requires Time, it may perhaps appear to be concluded in a very few days, and that may convince the World, that *Six Months Conferences* have not been held in vain.

These are the wondrous Concessions made to us by our new Friends, which are not equal by any means to those granted by the old Preliminaries; and if they were a great deal better, we shall see they are dearly paid for in the Articles that follow relating to our Allies, every one of whom are great Sufferers by this new Scheme; which if we were not bound in Justice and Honour to prevent, yet the Interest we have in their Security will necessarily involve us in what affects them.

In the seventh Article, the King consents that the *Spanish Netherlands* shall serve for a Barrier to the *States*; and that the Barrier may be as insignificant as possible, 'tis signify'd in this and the next Arti-

cle, that these Provinces are given to the *Elector of Bavaria*, and are to continue his; a good Ally for the *Dutch* to trust, who has once betray'd these Provinces to *France*, and will no doubt take the first occasion he can to do it again, if he ever put into possession of them. Nothing in truth can be more ridiculous than the Gift of these Provinces to the *Elector*, when the Donor has them not to give; for this pretended Gift is the Contrivance of the last Year, and never made in due form, or in an authentick manner by the Duke of *Anjou*, nor has the *Elector* ever exercis'd in any of the Towns compris'd in this Gift any Acts of Sovereign Power that I could hear of, unless it be at *Luxemburg*, his Place of Residence. But this is all a Juggle, and the Gift is valid or not valid, as 'twill best serve the Turn. But suppose this Difficulty remov'd, these Provinces, as they were left at the Death of King *Charles*, are, we know by long Experience, a very pitiful and Insufficient Barrier; *Brabant* is cover'd only with one single Frontier, and *Flanders* lies quite open to *Ghent*, and between that and *Ostend* all is in a most defenceless State; and *Ghent* it self very incapable of making any long Resistance. So that were the *States* to trust to this Barrier, they would perpetually be in danger of being over-run by *France*, and the chief End lost for which they went into the War. Such a Barrier as this has been given after the ill Successes of former Wars, and could not have been deny'd, if this had been the Reverse of what it is. So far therefore I presume no Thanks are due for this Cession, since without it the *Dutch* could never think of sheathing their Sword. Let us now see what Addition the *French* are willing to make to it. They consent to augment it with *Burmes* and its District, call'd *Burmer-Ambacht*, *Fort Knoque*, *Ypres* with its Castellany, and *Menin* with its *Verge*. The last of these Places we owe the *French* no Thanks for, it having been taken from them in the

Ramellies Campaign, the rest is very little, compar'd with the Places given up by the old Preliminaries, which add to these, *Lille, Tournay, Conde* and *Maubeuge*, of which the three last were in the hands of the *French* when those Preliminaries were concluded; and either *Lille* or *Tournay* alone are more worth, than all the un-conquer'd Places put together, which by this Article they offer to give up.

These are the Places the *French* consented to give for a Barrier three Years ago, when there was much less Danger of the Allies penetrating into the heart of *France*, than there might be now, were we all alike dispos'd to it. And this the *French* consented to sacrifice to a Peace, without pretending to any thing in exchange. But some late Events have, in their Opinion, so alter'd the Face of Things, that they now offer but a small part of what they did then, and for that they expect much more than an Equivalent; for one Town and two Forts, they demand *Douay* with Fort *Scarpe*, *Bethune*, *Aire* with Fort *St. Francois*, and *St. Venant*, and this under pretence of a Barrier for *France*: whereas, if all these Places were quitted by them, as long as they have *St. Omer*, *Arras* and *Cambray*, they have a better Barrier than the Allies will have, tho they keep *Lille* and *Tournay*, if they have not the other Places with them; which by the way they can't keep if *Lille* and *Tournay* are parted with, and for that reason 'twas convenient to insist on this Exchange, as any one may see that will be at the pains to look into a Map. And if the Barrier of the *French* were still less, Peace is so much the Interest of *England* and the *States*, that they have no reason to think we shall disturb them, if they don't disturb us. This Pretence therefore of a Barrier for *France*, means nothing else but that there should not be left a good Barrier for the *Dutch*. But there is one thing in this Article so very ridiculous and impudent, that I could almost be positive *Abel* and

his Friends had the penning of it; and that is, that there is no notice taken of *Bouchain*, as if it were not worth mentioning, or that it was concerted to be retaken, while the Peace is treating. 'Tis convenient to disgrace as much as possible the late G——l, and in order to it, to lessen the Glory of the last Campaign, which will alone make his Name immortal. If this Artifice be purely *French*, they make their Court with great Address, and may be sure 'twill be taken very kindly.

But to proceed: The eighth Article gives leave to the Dutch to put what number of Troops they please into the Barrier-Towns, and that they shall be maintain'd by the Country. This is very kind indeed, a great deal kinder than the Conduct of the Allies, which thinks 400000 Crowns too much to be given to the States for the Maintenance of their Garisons. But what is it the *French* give in this? The Revenue of a Country that is not their own; a Country they must quit all Pretensions to, before any Peace can possibly be made: and in my humble opinion, no Thanks upon any foot are due for this Concession. For the Sovereignty of the *Netherlands* will be in them, or not: If it be, their Promise is a Promise only, and can't by any means be depended on; and if it be not, they promise what they can't perform, they promise what their Consent will ne'er be ask'd for, and what it is not in their power to refuse. To talk therefore of giving them leave to keep what number of Troops they please, and to maintain them at the Charge of the Country, is gross Banter. But if this Consent has any Sense in it, 'tis given in the name of the Elector of *Bavaria*, upon supposition the Sovereignty will remain in him; which is a pretty Supposition for Men that would be thought to mean a good Peace.

But if this Consent be really nothing, yet the Shew of it is something, and is convenient for the sake of the next Article; wherein *Lille* and *Tournay*
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with their Citadels are demanded, as an Equivalent for demolishing of Dunkirk: Which Demand, how unjust and absurd it is, I have already shewn upon the second Article; besides that the Surrender of them draws with it the Surrender of all the other Places since taken, as I have observ'd before. But because it looks at first sight very unreasonable that the Dutch should in compliment to England part with Towns of so much importance, which they are in possession of, and which they took at a very great Expence, (the Expence of the Sieges having lain wholly upon them) to salve a little these absurd Appearances, this Demand is made in consideration of this Cession, and of this Consent. The Consent I have shewn is nothing; the Cession, as it relates to the Spanish Netherlands, is nothing but what the French must have made, let the Event of the War have been what it would: and for the Places they offer to add to that Barrier, they demand in the seventh Article more than an Equivalent. So that in truth the Dutch must part with *Lille* and *Tournay*, Places that have cost them prodigious Sums to conquer, and which are of infinite Concern for their Security, in consideration of nothing; which therefore I take to be a most nonsensical and impudent Demand, and directly contrary to the *Security* stipulated for them in the Grand Alliance; and I may add, for us too, since I must again say our Interests are inseparable.

The tenth Article relates to the Commerce of the Dutch, and consents they shall have the *Tarif* of 1664. So far is very well; but there follow two cruel Exceptions; first, of six sorts of Merchandize, which probably affects the most considerable Branches of their Trade; and secondly, that they shall pay fifty sols per Tun on all their Ships that come into France. This is not only short of what was granted in the old Preliminaries, which agree to the *Tarif* of 1664. without any Exception, and to an Exemption from the

the fifty Sols *per Tun*; but even to what they agreed to at the Treaty of *Reswick*, when that Imposition was taken off in the fullest words possible, in a separate Article: and in the Body of the Treaty of Commerce then made, 'tis stipulated in the twelfth Article, That *the Tarif of 1664. shall be abser'd, if another be not agreed on in three months.* But sure this is a strange Offer, to put their Commerce on a worse foot than was agreed at the end of a War so different from this. And if some body else is not to get what the *Dutch* are to lose, 'tis very much beyond my Comprehension.

The eleventh Article relates to the great Point of Trade to the *Spanish Indies*, which is settled just as was apprehended from Monsieur *Menager's* Preliminaries, That *England and Holland shall be allow'd to trade thither, in the same manner as before the Death of King Charles.* And so far is indeed conformable to the last Clause of the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance; but what follows, directly contradicts the preceding Clause, which most expressly stipulates, when translated as it ought to be, and not as the Author of the *Conduct* has corrupted it, That *the French shall not be permitted to sail thither on account of Traffick directly or indirectly, on any pretence whatsoever.* And this the *French* consented to in the seventh Preliminary Article, in the very same words. But in these new Offers they tell us, the King will promise that the *French* shall submit to the same Regulations with respect to the Commerce and Navigation of the *Spanish Indies, as other Nations.* This is a single Clause, but Mountains hang by it, Mountains of Gold and Silver, which will be transfer'd from us to *France*, by admitting them into this Trade; which *England* thought of so much importance when the Grand Alliance was made, that there is no one thing so particularly guarded against in the whole Treaty. But the Interest of *England*, it seems, is chang'd; or Common Sense is not the same

same it was. The *French* are innocent, harmless Creatures; their Power or Trade can't hurt us, they are our darling Favourites; the only formidable Enemy to *England* are the *Dutch*. The Neighbourhood of a Protestant Ally, who combin'd with the rest of *Europe* are not a Match for *France*, is greatly to be fear'd: but the confessedly exorbitant Power of a Popish Prince, the inveterate Enemy of our Religion and Nation, is to be courted, establish'd, aggrandiz'd at the Expence of all our Allies, particularly of the surest Ally we have, the *States*; at the Expence of what is dearer to us than our Allies, our selves, our Religion, our Liberty, our Trade, which can never be safe till *France* is humbled. Thus the Grand Alliance is broke, with respect to the *Security* and *Commerce* of us and the *States*.

The three next Articles regard the Emperor; but before I enter upon them, I must observe the Security the *French* King gives, that he will observe the same Regulations in Trading to the *Spanish Indies*, as other Nations do: he consents, That all the Potentates of *Europe* may enter into the Guaranty of this Promise. Words, and nothing else. Who are these Potentates that will make War upon *France*, if they break in too much upon the *Spanish Trade*? Can this be expected from Powers that are not concern'd in it? And who are those but *Spain*, *Holland*, and our selves? The Guaranty of the Duke of *Anjou*, I presume, is worth much, who, no body can doubt, will join with *France* against us, and not with us against *France*; so that we can expect no Help but from the *Dutch*. And what is it we are to hope for from them, when they are us'd in the manner design'd in these Offers? Shall they quarrel with *France*, and draw a War upon themselves, when cover'd with a very weak Barrier, to protect us in our *Spanish Trade*? Can any thing be more absurd than such a Supposition? And if they were in a Condition to do this, which they neither are nor can be, could we

we ask it of them after such barbarous Usage, as is without example, between Powers ally'd, and while actually engag'd in the same War, and who have one and the same Interest? All the Security, therefore, of the King's Performance of this Promise is resolv'd into his own bare Word, and what we are able to do our selves to oblige him to the Observance of it; but that, unless we were alone a Match for *France*, is nothing. This most important Article, therefore, of the *Spanish* Trade, depends at last solely upon the Word of a Prince, who never once kept his Word, when he thought it for his Interest to break it.

But to come to the Emperor: as bad as the *States* are us'd, his Treatment in these Articles is a great deal worse; for in lieu of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, to which he has an undoubted Right, which is fully acknowledg'd and consented to by *France*, not only in the Old Preliminaries, but in all the subsequent Negotiations till now, he is to be content with *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sardinia*. What a strange Reverse must have happen'd in Affairs, to make one hear this Offer without Astonishment? Did *France* two Years ago ask nothing but *Naples*, and *Sardinia*, or *Sicily*, for the Duke of *Anjou*; and do they expect the Emperor should now be content with such a Share himself? Shall *Sicily* be left in the hands of the Duke of *Anjou*, which is the Granary to *Naples*? Shall the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, which so nearly affect the Safety of the Emperor's Dominions in *Italy*, be suffer'd to remain in *French* Hands? Shall the Emperor, instead of recovering by Treaty the Parts of the Monarchy he is not yet possess'd of, give up those he is? Shall he be dispossest'd of *Catalonia*, and the adjacent Isles, when he has a Right to the whole? Shall it be thought a Favour to let him keep a part of what he is already Master of; such a Favour, that he must, in consideration of it, desist from all Pretensions to the other Parts of the Monarchy,

Monarchy, and withdraw his Troops? Good God! What Articles are these? This is giving Peace with a witness to Europe, according to the old Style of France; whereas I was Fool enough to think, it was now our Turn to give Peace to them.

Thus the great End of the War, the *Spanish* Succession, is given up in three Words, against all Justice, all Treaties, against the express Declaration of the First Grand Alliance, and the plain Intention of the Second; and instead of a just and reasonable Satisfaction, there is not so much reserv'd by these Offers to the Emperor, as in the Eighth Article we engage to use our utmost Endeavours to recover for him: for there by Name are reckon'd up (besides *Milan* and *Naples*) *Sicily*, the Lands and Islands on the Coast of *Tuscany*, and in the *Mediterranean*, that belong to *Spain*; in which the Commerce of *England* and *Holland*, as 'tis there express'd, is concern'd, as well as the Security of the Emperor's Hereditary Countries.

If no body were to suffer by the Loss of *Spain*, but the Emperor himself, it might be matter of less Concern perhaps; but what he loses we lose, who are more interested in the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy, than the Emperor himself; and what we both lose, *France* gets, which must prove in the end equally the Ruin of us both. But so much has been said by others, and so well upon this Subject, that I have not Patience to say more: If we are undone, we are undone. If this Article, which we are so much concern'd in, don't affect us; much less shall we have any Sense of the Hardships put on our Allies in those that follow.

In the Thirteenth, for the Consolation of the Emperor and Empire, they are told, they shall have the same Frontier they had before this War: This is Monsieur Menager's Convenient Barrier. But could one suppose, that by those Words no Concession at all should be made? that the Empire should be left in the same defenceless State, in a worse State than

it ought to have been in by the Treaty of *Reswick*, the Articles of which, 'tis well known, were never executed? Shall the Emperor, for his Loss of *Spain*, for his relinquishing some Parts of that Monarchy which he is actually possess'd of, have no Compensation made upon the *Rhine*? How different is this from the Old Preliminaries? where, besides the Cession of the entire Monarchy to King *Charles*, 'tis agreed, that the *French King* shall, with the Cession of *Landau*, restore *Strasburg*, with Fort *Kehl*, and *Brissac*; and demolish, at his own Expence, all the strong Places he has built upon the Upper *Rhine*, from *Basil* to *Philipsburg*; which by these new Offers will lie open to perpetual Invasion, in its whole extent, without one Place in the hands of the Empire for its Defence on the left side of that River, and but one on the right. Let the worst Peace be made that can be, the Empire, one would think, might be always secure of a good Barrier, while the Emperor is in possession of the Countries of two Electors, the Restoration of whom to their Electorates surely is worth something; and yet I can't find by these Offers, that the least Inch of Ground is to be given for it. In the Fourteenth Article the King demands *their Re-establishment in the amplest manner possible*; and that *in consideration of all the Terms above specify'd*; but what these Terms are, I confess, I can't perceive, there being no one thing granted, that the *French* could have deny'd after the most successful War, or which is not in the foregoing Offers abundantly overpaid for. I'm sure those Electors in Justice never ought to be intirely restor'd; nor can any Restoration of them be made with the Safety either of the Emperor or Empire, if their Defence be not more effectually provided for, than is to be expected from these Offers.

This single Article, in point both of Interest and Honour, is of so much Consequence to *France*, that the compassing of it, is alone worth all the Concessions

cessions pretended to be made to the Allies in these Offers, tho' no other Consideration were given for them, and tho' it were limited as 'tis in the Old Preliminaries, where 'tis agreed, among other things in prejudice of these Electors, that the Imperial Decrees, by which the *Upper Palatinate*, and the Dignity of First Elector, are given to the Elector *Palatine*, shall continue in force. All that the King really offers for the entire Restoration of these Electors, is in the Close of this Article, where 'tis propos'd in return, to own the Ninth Electorate, and the Title of the King of *Prussia*: this is a true *French Bargain*, two Words (for they are nothing more) are thought to be an Equivalent for two Electorates. But in the Old Preliminaries a great deal more is promis'd to the King of *Prussia*, without any Condition tack'd to it: 'tis there stipulated, not only that his Title shall be own'd, but that he shall not be disturb'd in the possession of *Neuschatel* and *Valengin*.

The next Article declares, That as to *Savoy*, *Every thing shall be restor'd on both Sides*, that all may be as it was before the War. But how can that possibly be? Has not the King destroy'd *Montmelian*, the only Place of Strength in all *Savoy*? And is not that whole Country by that means expos'd to *France*, whenever they please to pick a Quarrel? And what is of more consequence, Did not the *French King* dismantle all the strong Places he took in *Piedmont* before the Battle of *Turin*? a barbarous piece of Cruelty and Revenge unheard of in former Wars, as many other Inhumanities were, till practis'd by his most Christian Majesty. 'Tis impossible, therefore, to put the Affairs of the Duke of *Savoy* in the State they were in before the War, if he is to give up the Places he has taken from *France*, as by this Article he must. The Allies in their Conferences had so much regard to the Interests of this Prince,

that they not only stipulated in the Preliminaries, that he should keep all the Places he was then possess'd of, that he might have a tolerable good Barrier; but by the Thirty Second Article room was reserv'd for his Royal Highness to make such further Demands as he should think necessary.

Some People perhaps will pretend, that we need be in no Concern for the Interests of this Prince, since there appears to be so good an Understanding between his M ——— rs also and those of *France*; and the Talk of a certain Match with the Princess of *Piedmont*, may be thought a sufficient Proof of the King's intended Kindness to him. But till there is better Ground for such a Report, what Credit can one give to it?

The Fifteenth Article concerns poor *Portugal*, who are not to have the least Consideration for all they have done or suffer'd this War, nor any Benefit from their Treaties with us: in order to which they and their Treaties have been handled in the manner we have seen; tho' no one Alliance, no not all the Alliances made this War, have been so beneficial to us as those with *Portugal*: nay, if Monsieur *Trouin* had been able to keep any footing in their *American* Dominions, they might have expected to be left in a worse Condition than they were in before the War; for 'tis not said, that if any Places have been taken, they shall be restor'd; but if there be any Difference to settle, Endeavours shall be us'd to agree it amicably: which Words in the Mouth of a French M ——— r, if it be left to be settled after the Peace, mean just nothing, as appears by their Usage of every one of the Allies in all former Treaties, and particularly that of *Reswick*.

By the Seventeenth Article the King consents to concert Measures for preventing the Union of the Crowns of *France* and *Spain* on the same Head. But after what our Eyes have seen, we may be sure all Measures

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Measures of this kind have at the bottom no Meaning in them. Stronger Renunciations can't be made, than those that have been broke, and therefore we may be very confident all future ones, when Occasion serves, will be broke in the same manner; and of this the Prospect is not very remote, there being by the unexpected Death of the *Dauphin*, nothing now, between the Duke of *Anjou* and the Crown of *France*, but the Lives of two small Infants; which will make it his Interest more than ever to govern *Spain* with an Eye to *France*, and to take such Measures, as shall, upon occasion, secure the Dependance of one upon the other, and render the first in effect no more than a Province to the last. And sure this Apprehension, when it is so near, will alarm us in earnest, and bring us to our Wits again: not that the Difference is very great, whether they be united or not; for *Europe* is almost as much concern'd, that those two Kingdoms should not be in one House, as one Person: and the Event in either Case, will, in all humane Probability, be much the same; that is, the ingrossing the Trade and Riches and Power of both Worlds, the Ruin of the House of *Austria*, and of *Holland*, the Extirpation of the Protestant Religion, and the Establishment of an Universal Monarchy upon the Ruins of all Princes and States that will not servilely submit.

The last Article is an Article of Form only, and if there were any Sense in it, it ought to be the First and not the Last, *viz.* That all former Treaties namely, of *Munster*, &c. shall be repeated and confirm'd, repeated they be, but confirm'd to any Purpose we are sure they will not. To talk of confirming Treaties that have been so often broke, the same Treaties that were never kept from the Moment they were made; to talk of confirming such Treaties is a great Jest: And so indeed is this whole Plan from Beginning to End, if we had not Grounds to fear 'tis too serious

serious a matter to be laugh'd at. These are the Offers of *France*, in explication of Monsieur *Ménager's* seven Preliminaries, which have so solemnly been deny'd to be *Preliminaries*; but that we must not wonder at, Truth seems to have been for some time entirely banish'd from among us, and a Spirit of Delusion has possess'd the Land.

If any thing can open our Eyes, it must be these ignominious Offers, which have put our Allies into the greatest Consternation, and will have the same Effect on us, if a Sense of Justice, Interest and Honour, if a Sense of Religion, and Liberty, and Self-Defence can awaken us to a true sight of things. What Good can be expected from such Offers? Or what Security can we have that any Peace can be lasting upon such Terms? One way, I confess, such a Peace may be *lasting*; the Power of *France* will by it be made so very formidable, that no body perhaps will have Courage to oppose any Attempts that Crown shall hereafter make upon their Liberties. Upon this foot the *French* flatter'd themselves the Peace of *Reswyck* would have been a lasting one, and that no body would dare to dispute with a Power already so strong, when the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy was added to it. But the Thoughts of such a Peace to a Free People must be worse than any War: and if *France* should be again mistaken, and any of its Neighbours should have too much Spirit to submit tamely to its future Invasions, what must be the Consequence? No one Power upon the *Continent*, nor all together, can make head to purpose against *France*, without the help of *England*. What then shall *England* do? Shall it sit still, and see all the Powers of *Europe* subdu'd one after another to the arbitrary Will of one? And shall we think the Evil will not in the end reach our selves? But why do I ask, what *England* will do in that Case? It will then have no Liberty

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berty of Choice, if the Designs in favour of the P——r succeed; and when *England, France* and *Spain* are in Hands so intimately join'd, what can oppose a Deluge of *Popery* and *Slavery* breaking in upon us, and overspreading the whole Earth? I dread the horrid Consequences that not our *Posterity*, but our selves shall feel, if they are not prevented by a good Peace, which 'tis certain from these Offers there are not the least hopes of.

But it will be said, as I have hinted in the beginning, that these Offers are not *decisive*, that the Allies will give in their Demands, and that *France* will for a Peace make *considerable Abatements*. Are they that say so sure of this? If they are, why don't they let our Allies know what they are to trust to? Why don't they reject such a scandalous *Plan* at first sight? What Union and Harmony can be expected among the M——rs of the Allies, if those of one Prince appear to be in the Secret with *France*, while the rest are shut out, as if they were *Mediators* only, and not treating in conjunction with their Friends?

And what is the meaning of this Article in the *Supplement*, which is one of *Abel Roper's* own Papers, and I need say no more to prove its Authority? The words are these: *Hague, Feb. 19. N. S.* speaking of a Conference upon the Answer that is to be given to the *French* on the 5th of *March*, "The Design of the said Conference was as well to agree upon the Demands and Pretensions of this State, as upon the Method in which the Answer of the Allies ought to be return'd. The Question being, Whether it should be done by all the Allies, &c. in conjunction; or whether the Ministers of each Prince or State should deliver in their Principals Demands separately: It is the Opinion of the *British* Plenipotentiaries, it seems, that this last Method ought to be observ'd; whereas the

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“ *Imperialists* insist, that it ought to be done jointly.” The Reader will judge whether this is the best Method to oblige the *French* to make *considerable Abatements*.

But I may venture to foretel, that either the *French* have not promis’d to make such Abatements, or that if they have, ’tis not in the power of those they have been made to, to oblige them to keep their Words. That some Abatements will be made, no body can doubt; for example, *Sicily*, and the *Towns on the Coast of Tuscany* may be given to the Emperor; what was promis’d the Empire in the *Reswyck Treaty*, but not perform’d, may be promis’d again, and be as well perform’d; the Duke of *Savoy* may have what is stipulated in the old Preliminaries, and some other trifling Concessions may be made: but the great Points, a good *Barrier* for the *Empire* and *Holland*, is not from these Offers to be hop’d for; the preservation of our *Spanish Trade* can never upon this foot be effectually secur’d. The whole therefore will come to this: Some Concessions such as these will, I presume, be made, the Allies will think them very unreasonable, some other People perhaps may not be of their Minds: In the mean time the Campaign will draw on; for want of timely Supplies, Recruits, Horses and Magazines, the Enemy will be in the Field first; and having nothing to apprehend on the side of *Flanders*, they will invade the Empire with a vast Army, and force a Submission to the most unjust and unreasonable Terms.

This may perhaps a little startle honest Men; but the way is prepar’d for us to expect the worst, our Allies are by a great Writer all render’d contemptible and odious, their Treaties with us damn’d, and their whole Conduct censur’d. This is to make us indolent and unconcern’d; but if any remains of Sense, of Interest and Honour are left, and we are shock’d
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at the Thoughts of such Terms, there will be a ready Answer, *We would have procur'd better Terms for them, but could not prevail; 'tis their own Fault, it can't be help'd, 'tis now too late, we must submit; they must now make Peace on the best Terms they can, or be content to carry on the War alone; the Terms for our selves are pretty good, and Delays will only serve to make them worse; a separate Peace therefore rather than none at all.* Must it be? Well, then it MUST. Fatal Word! Oh may it ne'er be heard! May the Glory of the *British Arms*, and the Wisdom of our Councils, establish the Repose and Safety of the World, and procure this unhappy Nation all the Blessings of a lasting honorable Peace. A separate Peace is not yet made; and when I consider her Majesty's most Gracious Speech, her Instructions to her Ambassadors, the Concern she has express'd for her Allies, and the Addressee of both her Houses, and particularly the Indignation with which the House of Lords have resent'd these last Offers in their Address of the 15th, I resolve against all other Appearances to hope it never will.

But my greatest Reliance is on the good Providence which has so often appear'd in our behalf, when our Condition, thro our own Folly, has been most helpless. The sudden Turn given to Affairs by the *Dauphin's* Death, an Event which nothing but Providence has any share in, is a new Declaration of God in our Favour, that he is still willing to save us out of the extreme Dangers we are threaten'd with, if we are but willing to be sav'd our selves.

The Prospect, this surprizing Incident gives a King, who is almost at the end of his own Days, of a long Minority after him, will naturally make him desirous to leave his Kingdoms disengag'd from so ruinous a War. This he must greatly be concern'd for, if he has any Bowels either for his People

of Children; and this gives the Allies such an Advantage, as will render them inexorable before God and Man, if they do not unite in their Endeavours for a Good Peace.

From this new View of Things, I can't but hope for the return of the old Preliminaries, and that we shall have the *Wisdom and Resolution TO DEMAND and TO INSIST UPON*, and that the Enemy will have the *JUSTICE and Equity* is *YIELD UP* what we have hitherto been fighting for.

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